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Prime Minister Fico’s Russian card 
Jakub Groszkowski, in cooperation with Szymon Kardaś
Since the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, the position of Slovakia’s left-wing 
government towards Russia has been ambiguous. Bratislava has accepted the EU sanctions 
targeting Russia and the plan for strengthening NATO’s eastern flank. At the same time, ho-
wever, Prime Minister Robert Fico’s government has maintained close political relations with 
the Kremlin. It has called for the intensification of Slovak-Russian economic relations and has 
repeatedly criticised the sanctions, speaking in tandem with Russian propaganda in so doing. 
Slovakia’s Prime Minister is hoping that by playing the role of one of the leaders in the EU and 
NATO who are most willing to cooperate with Russia, he will gain economic benefits and win 
votes in next spring’s upcoming parliamentary elections. 
Despite numerous pro-Russian gestures, Slovakia has been limiting the number of areas in 
which Moscow could exert pressure on Bratislava. As it strives to become independent of 
Russia, Slovakia has ensured possible alternative fuel supplies for itself. Moreover, it has been 
gradually replacing Russian-made military equipment with equipment made in the West. The 
Slovak government does intend to develop the country’s cooperation with Russia, including 
in strategic areas involving supplies and transit of oil and gas, as well as supplies of nuclear 
fuel. Nevertheless, it has been making efforts to gain easy access to an alternative source of 
supplies in each of these areas. Beset by crises, Russia has ever fewer economic cooperation 
opportunities to offer Slovakia, and Slovak businesses operating on the Russian market have 
to take into account the growing risk of insolvency of local contractors. To a great extent, the-
refore, Slovak-Russian relations have been reduced to rhetorical statements confirming the 
desire for closer cooperation, and to visions of joint projects accompanied by an ever shorter 
list of feasible cooperation initiatives.
A symbolic alliance
Prime Minister Fico’s working visit to Moscow 
(on 1–2 June 2015) was another high-level Slo-
vak-Russian meeting organised in a period of 
cool Russia-EU relations. Both sides intend to 
promote the impression that political coop-
eration between the two countries is close. To 
achieve this, several initiatives have been organ-
ised, including visits related to the 70th anniver-
sary of the end of World War II. In April 2015, 
Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited 
Slovakia to take part in anniversary events com-
memorating Bratislava’s liberation, and in May 
2015 Prime Minister Fico attended Victory Day 
celebrations in Moscow. The Slovak government 
has largely accepted the image of the Red Army 
as a force which had a major influence on the 
victory over fascism (this image has been actively 
promoted in Russia), and few Slovaks question 
the Red Army’s role in the country’s liberation. 
Referring to the anniversary of the end of World 
War II, Slovakia’s President Andrej Kiska, who has 
criticised Russia’s policy on a number of occa-
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sions, has called on Slovaks to light a candle “on 
the grave of each Soviet soldier who was killed 
in the war in Slovakia”. Due to the situation in 
Ukraine, however, the President refused to take 
part in the celebrations organised in Moscow. 
The Prime Minister, on the contrary, travelled to 
Moscow to celebrate the anniversary of Victory 
Day, arguing that “it is necessary to separate his-
torical facts from current politics”1. 
The Slovak-Russian exchange of symbolic bene-
fits was put to the test in June 2015, a few days 
before Prime Minister Fico’s visit to Moscow, 
when Russian state television aired propaganda 
material on, among other topics, the 1968 inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops. 
The broadcast stated that the Pact’s interven-
tion had saved Czechoslovakia from an invasion 
by NATO troops allied with German fascists. Al-
though the broadcast caused outrage in both 
the Czech Republic and in Slovakia, as well as 
protests by Czech and Slovak diplomats, Russia 
failed to apologise and the broadcast continues 
to be available on the TV station’s website. 
The number and level of Slovak-Russian meet-
ings has not been justified by a need to attend 
to any specific, urgent issues. High level contact 
on economic issues has in fact continued unin-
terrupted. In May 2015, a meeting of the Slo-
vak-Russian intergovernmental committee for 
economic and scientific-technical cooperation 
was held in Bratislava. During his working vis-
it to Moscow in June 2015, Fico met President 
Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev 
and the Speaker of the Duma Sergey Naryshkin. 
1 Prime Minister Robert Fico took part in all the celebra-
tions apart from the military parade on the Red Square; 
instead, he met Czech President Miloš Zeman.
During the visit, several documents were signed 
merely to confirm the negotiations being con-
ducted, and to declare a willingness to continue 
these. 
An account in the black
The reinforcement of Slovak-Russian political 
relations has been favourable to both sides. 
In exchange for his pro-Russian gestures, Fico 
was given the opportunity to meet one of the 
world’s leaders, which he can use in his cam-
paign ahead of parliamentary elections next 
spring. This is considered an asset by some of 
his voters, who have been distrustful of the USA 
and have favoured closer relations with Russia. 
Additionally, this opportunity can be used as 
an asset in the Prime Minister’s rivalry with the 
Slovak National Party which has recently been 
gaining popularity. In addition, Slovakia needs 
Russia’s support to force through the candida-
cy of Miroslav Lajčák, its deputy Prime Minister 
and Foreign and European Affairs Minister, to 
the office of UN Secretary General. A successful 
nomination would be the culmination of efforts 
by Slovak diplomacy and a prestigious achieve-
ment by the government. Fico has also pushed 
for an increase in the volume of Slovak-Russian 
trade exchange (which in recent months has 
seen a sharp decline), and for maintaining the 
transit of Russian gas via Slovak pipelines. Prime 
Minister Fico has also been trying to prevent his 
country’s relations with Russia from becoming 
worse than Russian-Hungarian relations. The 
fear that this might be the case has been evident 
in recurring debates on the westward extension 
of the broad-gauge railway. Analysing the de-
velopment of Russian-Hungarian relations, the 
government in Bratislava needs to take into con-
sideration the possibility that Slovak-Hungarian 
relations, which have always been complex and 
riddled with a number of unresolved disputes, 
might worsen. The likelihood of disputes be-
tween neighbours being reignited has been ris-
ing as political rivalry between the ruling camp 
Fico’s pro-Russian gestures have enabled 
the Kremlin’s propaganda to undermine 
the coherence of the EU’s policy towards 
Russia.
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and the nationalist-oriented opposition increas-
es. This, however, has been rather more evident 
in Hungary than in Slovakia.
Fico’s gestures have been appreciated by Mos-
cow, as they have enabled Russian propaganda 
to undermine the consistency of the EU’s poli-
cy towards Russia. They have also enabled the 
Kremlin to demonstrate that Russia does have 
partners in the EU which are open to mutually 
favourable cooperation (Cyprus, Greece, Hun-
gary and Italy used to appear in this role). This 
type of policy by EU member states encourag-
es Russia to make repeated attempts at break-
ing the consensus within the EU. Fico has many 
times criticised the EU’s sanctions against Rus-
sia, although at the same time Slovakia does not 
intend to block the European consensus on this 
matter. Like other EU states, Slovakia has made 
modification of the sanctions conditional on the 
implementation of the Minsk peace deals. At 
a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in June 2015, 
Bratislava approved the extension of the sanc-
tions. The Slovak government has also been crit-
ical of the move to strengthen the permanent 
presence of NATO troops on NATO’s eastern 
flank, and has argued that global problems can 
be solved only in cooperation with Russia. 
Progress in Slovakia’s diversification 
initiatives
Russia has been Slovakia’s almost exclusive sup-
plier of oil, gas, nuclear fuel and nuclear tech-
nologies. However, due to investments carried 
out by consecutive Slovak governments follow-
ing the 2009 gas crisis, Slovakia is no longer 
fated to cooperate with Russia. Nonetheless, 
Bratislava has decided to sign long-term con-
tracts with Moscow, as it considers this the 
most profitable solution. 
Slovakia purchases almost all of the gas it con-
sumes from Gazprom (in 2014 the volume was 
approximately 4.4 bcm); however, thanks to the 
modernisation of the gas connections on its 
borders with Austria and the Czech Republic, 
from the technical point of view, Slovakia could 
withdraw from the contract with Russia and 
purchase gas on Western gas markets. Slova-
kia’s energy security has also been reinforced by 
investments carried out as part of construction 
of the North-South Corridor. The gas connec-
tion with Hungary has been launched recently, 
and an interconnector with Poland is expected 
to be completed in 2019. In September 2014, 
Bratislava started Central Europe’s largest gas 
reverse, allowing gas to be sent to Ukraine, 
thereby undermining the interests of Gazprom. 
In response to this, Russia reduced the volume 
of gas supplied to Slovakia by nearly a half, us-
ing the need to replenish stock as a pretext. 
These retaliatory measures, which lasted until 
March 2015, failed to have a negative effect on 
the Slovak economy. Moreover, according to 
reports by the Russian news agency TASS, the 
price for gas which Slovakia paid to Gazprom in 
2014 was one of the lowest in the EU2.
Due to the modernisation of the Slovak-Hungar-
ian oil connection, completed in February 2015, 
Slovakia has now been able to fully cover the 
demand of the Slovnaft refinery using oil from 
the Omišalj terminal in Croatia3. For econom-
ic reasons, however, Slovnaft prefers to treat 
this supply route as an alternative; in December 
2014 Bratislava signed a contract for the supply 
and transit of oil Moscow for another 15 years. 
2 According to data compiled by TASS, the price of gas for 
Slovakia (US$308 per 1,000 m3) is US$15 less than the 
price paid by Germany, and US$33 less than the average 
price of Russian gas supplied to clients in the EU and in 
Turkey.
3 The Bratislava-based refinery Slovnaft is owned by the 
Hungarian company MOL.
Slovakia is no longer fated to cooperate 
with Russia in the field of energy, but it 
continues to sign long-term agreements 
with Moscow, considering this the most 
profitable solution.
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Slovakia has maintained close cooperation 
with Russia also in the field of nuclear energy. 
Slovenské elektrárne, a company controlled 
by the Italian enterprise Enel4, is finishing the 
construction of two nuclear blocks modelled 
on Russian technology. Cooperation with Rus-
sia also includes the modernisation of existing 
power plants and the supply of nuclear fuel 
to the current and prospective blocks. Despite 
many years of problem-free cooperation, in No-
vember 2014 Slovenské elektrárne decided to 
make itself independent of Russia, and signed 
a contract for the supply of enriched uranium 
with an alternative supplier which has been 
protecting Slovak power plants against prob-
lems with the implementation of the current 
Russian contract5. Limited confidence in its 
Russian partners has not discouraged the Slo-
vak government from continuing negotiations 
on Slovak-Russian cooperation on the plans to 
construct new nuclear blocks in Jaslovské Bohu-
nice, although this project has very little chance 
of being implemented in the near future6. 
Eastring and Turkish Stream
Currently, one of the main topics in Slovak-Rus-
sian talks is cooperation in the field of the tran-
sit of Russian gas to Western Europe after the 
Russian-Ukrainian transit agreement expires on 
1 January 2020. This, according to announce-
ments by Gazprom, is when gas flowing via 
Ukraine and Slovakia to Western Europe will be 
redirected to the Turkish Stream pipeline. Pres-
ident Putin announced the plan to construct 
the Turkish Stream pipeline in December 2014, 
4 Enel owns 66% of shares in Slovenské elektrárne; the re-
maining stake belongs to the Slovak state.
5 According to Slovak media, the agreement was signed 
with Areva, but Slovenské elektrárne has not confirmed 
this information.
6 More on this topic: J. Groszkowski, ‘Słowacja’, [in:] Projek-
ty jądrowe w Europie Środkowej i Południowo-Wschod-
niej. Stan i perspektywy, edited by M. Gniazdowski, 
Raport OSW, pp. 27-35; http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/pub-
likacje/raport-osw/2015-06-23/projekty-jadrowe-w-eu-
ropie-srodkowej-i-poludniowo-wschodniej-stan-i
when the South Stream project was dropped. 
The plan undermines Slovakia’s interests, since 
Bratislava would like to retain its role of an im-
portant country in the transit of Russian gas to 
the West7, thereby reinforcing its energy secu-
rity and ensuring revenues to the state budget. 
During his visit to Moscow, Prime Minister Fico 
argued that the Russian project should be com-
bined with the Slovak plans involving the con-
struction of the Eastring pipeline which aims 
to connect Western Europe, via Slovakia and 
Hungary, with Romania and Bulgaria8. The Rus-
sian side has eagerly agreed to verify the Slovak 
project against Russian plans for technical and 
financial compliance.
In Moscow, Prime Minister Fico presented Eas-
tring as a project which can be reconciled with 
Russian plans to supply gas to Europe using 
a southern route. He pointed out, however, 
that the Slovak investment is to be carried out 
“with the participation and support of the EU”. 
Before that, Slovakia had already announced its 
efforts to put Eastring on the list of projects 
of common interests (PCI) and to obtain fund-
ing support from the EU. In the EU forum, the 
Slovak government and Eustream have empha-
7 In 2014, the volume of gas transit via the territory of Slo-
vakia amounted to 35.8 bcm (compared to 30 bcm of gas 
transit via the Nord Stream, nearly 34 bcm via the Yamal 
Europe pipeline, over 20 bcm via Moldova, and 16 bcm 
via Blue Stream). Slovakia is bound by a gas transit con-
tract with Gazprom which expires on 31 December 2028.
8 Representatives of the company Eustream, the Slovak 
gas transmission system operator controlled by the Slo-
vak state and the Czech company EPH, which is the initi-
ator and promoter of the Eastring project, did not take 
part in the talks held in Moscow.
Assuming that Eastring and Turkish Stream 
become fact, and that mainly Russian gas 
will flow through the Slovak pipeline, the 
transfer of gas from the EU-Turkey border 
onto European territory would be imple-
mented according to EU law.
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sised the project’s compliance with the assump-
tions of the energy union. They have presented 
Eastring as a system of two-way large-capaci-
ty gas connections, which will meet the goals 
related to the construction of the EU’s com-
mon gas market, and serve as a way to im-
prove the security of supplies in Central and 
South-Eastern Europe. These announcements 
mean that the company intends to carry out 
investments which are in line with the Third 
Energy Package. Assuming that Eastring and 
Turkish Stream become reality, and that main-
ly Russian gas will flow through the pipeline 
proposed by Slovakia, the transfer of gas from 
the EU-Turkey border onto European territory 
would be implemented according to EU law. 
Regardless of the real chances of connecting 
these pipelines, the fact that Fico has com-
bined the Slovak Eastring project and the Rus-
sian Turkish Stream project undoubtedly served 
Moscow’s interests, and could possibly hamper 
actions involving the Eastring project’s promo-
tion in the EU. The Russian project still remains 
largely virtual, the pipeline’s route has not been 
revealed, and no legally binding agreements 
have been signed with Turkey, although accord-
ing to announcements by President Putin and 
representatives of Gazprom, the first branch 
of the pipeline is to be launched in December 
2016. Despite this, in line with the expectations 
of the Kremlin, several EU member states (apart 
from Slovakia, these included Greece, Hungary, 
Italy and Austria) opened talks on the extension 
of infrastructural connections which would 
become an overland extension of the Turkish 
Stream pipeline. The Slovak-Russian talks on 
the new pipeline have thus become aligned 
with Moscow’s attempts at creating an impres-
sion that the project is much desired, enjoys 
wide-ranging support, and that its implemen-
tation is inevitable9. 
9 More on this topic: S. Kardaś, A. Łoskot-Strachota, ‘Gaz-
prom’s call for proposals: how many new gas pipelines to 
Europe?’, OSW Analyses, 24 June 2015; http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-06-24/gazproms-call-
proposals-how-many-new-gas-pipelines-to-europe
Military cooperation
Aside from Bulgaria, Slovakia is one of the EU 
countries most dependent on Russian military 
technology. This has been a result of Slovakia’s 
consent to Russia’s repayment of part of its 
debt with military equipment back in the 1990s. 
Slovakia imports components of MiG-29 fighter 
jets and of Mi-17 helicopters from Russia, and 
entrusts Russian companies with modernisa-
tion tasks involving these aircraft. In 2013, Slo-
vakia spent over €84 million on these services10. 
Also the Slovak air defence system (radar instal-
lations and missile defence systems) has been 
totally dependent on the supplies of compo-
nents from Russia. In the context of the war in 
Ukraine, Slovakia has decided to gradually be-
come independent of its cooperation with Rus-
sia. In April 2015, the Slovak government con-
sented to the purchase of nine American Black 
Hawk UH60M helicopters to replace its Mi-17 
aircraft. Bratislava has announced that it would 
abandon the use of MiG fighter jets when the 
Slovak-Russian agreement for their service and 
maintenance expires in November 2016. The 
Russian-made aircraft will most probably be re-
placed with Jas-39 Gripen jets made in Sweden, 
which Slovakia will lease on conditions similar 
to those applied by the Czech military. EU sanc-
tions against Russia are another element which 
has influenced the decisions taken by Bratisla-
va. When the Russian supplier of spare compo-
nents for Slovak radar systems, the Almaz-An-
10 Analýza možných dopadov sankcii EU na RF a zrušenia 
ciel EU s UA na ekonomiku SR, 2014.
The Slovak air defence system has been 
totally dependent on the supplies of com-
ponents from Russia. In the context of the 
war in Ukraine, Slovakia has decided to 
gradually become independent in its co-
operation with Russia.
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tey company, became subject to EU sanctions, 
Slovakia’s Ministry of Defence speeded up its 
work on replacing Russian radar systems with 
Western-made equipment11. Within a couple 
of years, as a result of the measures taken by 
Slovakia’s government, the Slovak military is 
likely to become independent of services and 
supplies of components from Russia. 
Regardless of these decisions and plans, Slova-
kia intends to continue its cooperation with Rus-
sian companies. During his visit to Moscow in 
June 2015, Prime Minister Fico announced that 
an agreement on modernisation and service 
of Mi-17 helicopters would shortly be signed. 
Pursuant to this agreement, the military works 
in Trenčín in Slovakia would service not only 
Slovak helicopters (until they are fully replaced 
with Black Hawks), but also perform commer-
cial service and modernisation of Mi-17 helicop-
ters from third countries. In Moscow, PM Fico 
expressed his country’s interest in modernising 
the S-300PMU missile defence system used by 
the Slovak army.
Other fields of cooperation
Prime Minister Fico’s visit to Moscow did not 
bring any progress on a number of significant 
projects whose implementation has not been 
completed and have little chance of being com-
pleted in the next few years, despite political 
support by the governments of Slovakia and 
Russia. A flagship example of one such project 
is the plan to extend a broad-gauge railway 
from near Košice to Bratislava and to Vienna, 
which remains in its preparatory phase. Negoti-
ations on the construction of a cyclotron centre 
(for scientific and medical purposes) have been 
under way for two decades. Russia promised to 
build the centre in Bratislava in exchange for the 
cancellation of a portion of its debt to Slovakia. 
11 Informačný materiál na rokovanie Rady vlady SR pre 
podporu exportu a investícií, 18 February 2015. ‘Sankcie 
medzi EÚ a RU – aktualny stav a dopady’.
The Slovak-Russian political cooperation, which 
has been particularly active in recent months, 
has limited effects. Using the opportunity of 
Prime Minister Fico’s visit to Moscow, an inter-
governmental agreement was signed concern-
ing cooperation on fighting illegal migration, 
among other issues. Other documents signed 
included several intergovernmental memoranda, 
concerning subjects including cooperation in the 
modernisation of agriculture and in tourism, as 
well as several agreements and memorandums 
on business cooperation12. Despite political ef-
forts, Slovak-Russian trade exchange has been 
largely limited to the import of energy fuels and 
nuclear fuel from Russia. In 2014, the volume of 
Slovakia’s exports to Russia and its imports from 
Russia fell by nearly 20%, and in the first quar-
ter of 2015 trade turnover declined by approxi-
mately 40%, mainly as a result of the economic 
crisis in Russia, caused by the drop in the price of 
crude oil and by depreciation of the rouble. The 
crisis which hit Russia has also affected Slovak 
companies such as Optifin Invest, co-owned by 
Alexej Beljajev, a businessman associated with 
Prime Minister Fico, and a Slovak descendant of 
Russian migrants. A large portion of Beljajev’s 
business undertakings involves the production 
of railway carriages which are then exported, 
onto the Russian market among others. Due to 
problems encountered by Beljajev’s Russian busi-
ness partners, one of his manufacturing plants in 
12 Russian-Slovak negotiations, 2 June 2015, http://govern-
ment.ru/en/news/18331/
Contrary to what the Slovak Prime Min-
ister was saying just a year ago, the in-
troduction of EU sanctions against Russia 
has not shaken the Slovak economy; in 
2014 there was an increase in both Slova-
kia’s imports and exports, and the coun-
try’s GDP rose by 2.4%.
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Slovakia was forced to limit its production. Prime 
Minister Fico has quoted this example as the best 
proof of the sanctions’ negative effects. It can 
be assumed that during his visit to Moscow in 
June 2015, PM Fico, during his talks with the 
head of Russian state railways Vladimir Yakun-
in, mentioned also Beljajev’s business undertak-
ings, among other issues. Nevertheless, the real 
significance of the sanctions on the condition of 
the Slovak economy has been very limited, as the 
share of the Russian market in Slovakia’s exports 
is negligible (it fell from 3.97% in 2013 to 3.21% 
in 2014)13. Contrary to what PM Fico was saying 
just a year ago, the introduction of EU sanctions 
against Russia has not shaken the Slovak econo-
my. In 2014, there was an increase in both Slova-
kia’s imports and exports, and the country’s GDP 
rose by 2.4% (compared to 1.4% in 2013). The 
Ukrainian-Russian conflict has contributed to 
a decline in the number of tourists visiting Slova-
kia. Interestingly, however, in 2014 the tourists 
who came to Slovakia spent €16 million more 
than in 2013. 
Difficult Eastern policy
The series of meetings between Slovak and Rus-
sian politicians held in recent months, in particu-
lar Robert Fico’s two visits to Moscow, has rein-
forced the view popular in Western Europe and 
in Ukraine that Slovakia’s left-wing government 
is willing to support the Kremlin’s interest in the 
forums of the EU and NATO. The Slovak govern-
ment has attempted to refute these charges, 
pointing to Slovakia’s involvement in helping 
Ukraine. In this context, Slovakia has been em-
phasising the significance of the gas reversal14, 
13 V. Šnídl, ‘Diplomati: Sankcie proti Putinovi nás nepoško-
dili, ekonomika bude rásť’, 16 May 2015, https://denni-
kn.sk/133896/diplomati-sankcie-proti-putinovi-nas-ne-
poskodili-ekonomika-bude-rast/ 
14 Since September 2014, Slovakia has enabled the transfer 
of Russian gas from Western Europe to Ukraine. The cur-
rent interconnector capacity is 14.5 bcm per year, which 
covers 73% of Ukraine’s import of gas. At the same time, 
the operation of the gas reversal is bringing revenues to 
the Slovak budget.
of its humanitarian and development aid15, and 
of initiatives aimed at transferring experiences 
connected with political transformation to Ukrai-
nians16. In addition, Slovakia has been trying to 
maintain positive political relations with Ukraine. 
Shortly before his talks in Moscow, Prime Min-
ister Fico called Ukraine’s President Petro Poro-
shenko to assure him that Slovakia’s stance on 
the issue of sanctions remains consistent with 
the EU-wide consensus, and that the transfer of 
gas from the West via Slovakia to Ukraine is not 
threatened. Still, the level of distrust in Slova-
kia’s relations with Ukraine has been high. This, 
among other reasons, results from Slovakia’s 
negative experience in its relations with Ukraine 
during the 2009 Gazprom-inspired gas crisis, 
when Bratislava repeatedly complained that it 
had been cheated by the government in Kyiv. 
Although the crisis has also undermined Slova-
kia’s trust in Russia, and has proved that good 
relations with the Kremlin cannot be seen as 
a guarantee of stable fuel supplies, in the eyes 
of the Slovak government Russia remains a more 
reliable partner than Ukraine. 
Slovakia has decided to play a game in which 
it intends to strengthen its strategic relations 
with the West on the one hand, while on the 
other sending numerous signals it suggesting 
that it is ready to advance its cooperation with 
15 In 2014, the value of Slovak development, technical and 
humanitarian aid amounted to approximately €900,000.
16 As part of a Visegrad Group project involving support 
for reforms in Ukraine, Slovakia organised an expert 
meeting in June concerning energy efficiency. A few 
days before the planned date, the meeting was can-
celled by the Ukrainian side.
The level of distrust in Slova kia’s rela-
tions with Ukraine has been high. This, 
among other reasons, results from Slova-
kia’s negative experience in its relations 
with Ukraine during the 2009 Gazprom- 
-inspired gas crisis.
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Moscow. Although Russia’s influence on Slova-
kia has been diminishing, the symbolic dimen-
sion of cooperation, which is being reinforced 
by Russian propaganda, has affected the coher-
ence of the West’s position towards the Krem-
lin. Beset by crises, Russia has not much to of-
fer Slovakia. Regardless of this, Prime Minister 
Fico is probably hoping that in the long-term 
perspective, when the relations between the 
West and Moscow improve, Slovakia will have 
a favourable position vis-à-vis Russia, which in 
turn might bring it considerable economic ben-
efits. Furthermore, Fico’s government has been 
guided by short-term calculations focused on 
the domestic political struggle ahead of parlia-
mentary elections next year. There is, however, 
some uncertainty surrounding the profit and 
loss account of Slovakia’s policy towards Rus-
sia. The Slovak government has undermined its 
credibility in its relations with its allies, and has 
launched cooperation with Moscow, exposing 
itself to the threat that the longer the conflict 
between the West and Russia lasts, the higher 
the price of this cooperation might be.
